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CIVIL PROCEDURE AND CONTRACT LAW-CONTRACTUAL FORUM-
SELECTION CLAUSES IN ERIE CASES: MORE THAN SUBSTANCE OR
PROCEDURE
I. INTRODUCTION
The enforceability "of forum-selection clauses is now one of the most
frequently litigated jurisdictional issues in the lower federal courts."' For at
least four reasons, this should be no surprise. First, particularly in the con-
text of international transactions, uncertainties regarding the potential forum
can create a significant obstacle to reaching an agreement. Because of this
uncertainty, contract drafters find that designating a forum adds predictabil-
ity to a deal. Second, the world is trading at unprecedented levels. Global
advances in telecommunications and transportation have created a world
that is, as Thomas Friedman famously put it, "flat.,, 2 By virtue of these ad-
vances, one can only expect a proliferation of forum-selection clause cases.
Third, notwithstanding the utility of forum-selection clauses, they can
present unique problems, and courts do not always enforce them. Histori-
cally, courts thought forum-selection clauses usurped their jurisdiction and
refused to enforce them as a matter of law.3 Today, however, modem
courts-both state and federal-liberally enforce forum-selection clauses,4
using the framework created in the watershed Supreme Court of the United
States case, The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.' Despite the broad accep-
tance of its framework, state-to-state application of The Bremen varies in
important ways.'
Fourth, and the focus of this note, the enforcement of forum-selection
clauses is especially complex when the suit is in federal court. After The
Bremen, federal courts had to wrestle with whether to apply the federal
standard from The Bremen, or the applicable state standard in diversity
cases, assuming the standards differed. The framework for answering this
question is provided by the complex and ever-developing doctrine of Erie
1. Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines
and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 27 TEx. INT'L L.J. 323, 342 (1992).
2. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 5 (1st rev. and expanded ed. 2006).
3. See infra Part II.B.1.
4. See, e.g., High Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 823 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Mo.
1992).
5. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
6. See infra Part II.B.2.
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Railroad Co. v. Tompkins7 and its progeny. Today, federal courts unani-
mously hold that the validity of forum-selection clauses is a procedural
question and, therefore, subject to federal law.8 However, this was not al-
ways so. A minority formerly held that the validity of forum-selection
clauses is a contracts question and, therefore, subject to state law. 9 As will
be demonstrated later in this note, the minority view came to the correct
conclusion, but unfortunately based on flawed premises.'°
This note will argue that, despite the procedural qualities of forum-
selection clauses, adherence to Erie and its progeny requires that state rather
than federal law govern the enforceability of forum-selection clauses in di-
versity cases. This note will first provide background on the applicable law,
including the doctrinal and historical development of the Erie doctrine," the
evolving treatment of forum-selection clauses,12 and the controversy over
Erie's application to forum-selection clauses. 13 This background will then be
used to make this note's two principle arguments: First, the validity of fo-
rum-selection clauses is an issue of procedure,14 and second, state law
should, nevertheless, determine the validity of forum-selection clauses.
5
II. BACKGROUND
This section will discuss three foundational issues that are essential to
this note's principal thesis. First, it will cover the most relevant cases that
have established the modem-day Erie doctrine.' 6 Then, this section will
provide a background on forum-selection clauses' 7T-their evolving accep-
tance in state and federal courts'8 and a few of the nuanced approaches by
various state courts in specific circumstances.' 9 Finally, after having dis-
cussed the Erie doctrine and forum-selection clauses, the section will ad-
7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8. See, e.g., Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1990); Manetti-Farrow,
Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1988); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (1 lth Cir. 1987).
9. General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc. 783 F.2d 352, 357 (3d Cir.
1986).
10. See infra Part II.C.2.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part lI.B.
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part lI.B. 1.
19. See infra Part II.B.2.
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dress the controversy regarding whether federal or state law should apply in
diversity cases.2°
A. The Erie Doctrine
The Erie doctrine is complex and vague, so much so that it has been
described as "unguided."'', Discussion of the Erie doctrine must begin with
Swift v. Tyson,22 which Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins23 overturned. 24 As
will be shown, Erie and Swift represent distinctly different judicial values.25
Overturning Swift represented a decisive judicial value shift, a point that will
be given significant treatment" as it seems to have been lost on the majority
in forum-selection clause diversity cases. Following the discussion of Erie
and Swift, this section will analyze the three famous substance-procedure
cases, paying particular attention to the value shift from Swift.27 These cases
provide the primary framework of modem Erie jurisprudence.
1. Swift v. Tyson
When Swift was decided, as surprising as it may sound today, many no-
table jurists viewed forum shopping positively, at least in commercial
cases, arguing that federalism increased the cost of doing business.29 In his
history of the Swift and Erie cases, Tony Freyer attributes this inclination to
several causes: state courts' perpetual legal errors;30 outright local preju-
dices;3' discrepancies in the treatment of various commercial instruments;
32
and differing views on the applicability of stare decisis to commercial law.
33
The complete facts of the Swift case are complicated and a bit murky,
but a synopsis is necessary to illustrate the unpredictable character of state-
to-state commercial law of its time. Jarius Keith and Nathaniel Norton, two
land speculators in northeastern Maine, paid a creditor with a promissory
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
22. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
23. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24. Id. at 79-80.
25. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
26. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
27. See infra Part II.A.4.
28. Tony Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance: The Swift & Erie Cases in American Feder-
alism, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW SERIES IN LEGAL HISTORY 19 (1981).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 20.
32. Id. at 21-23.
33. Id. at 23-24.
2012]
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note.34 The note was cashed at the creditor's bank and eventually sold to
Joseph Swift, the cashier of Keith and Norton's bank. 5 Keith and Norton
paid Swift by endorsing to him a bill of exchange that had been accepted by
a George Tyson as part of a separate transaction.36 The deal, which indebted
Tyson to Swift, almost certainly included fraud and possibly even collusion
between Swift and Norton.37 At the time, states did not uniformly favor ne-
gotiability.38 Consequently, there was uncertainty as to whether holders of
these instruments possessed an absolute right of recovery against debtors,
even when there might have been fraud.39
While several legal theories were pursued, Swift's suit against Tyson
was essentially for recovery of the debt from the bill of exchange.4" Tyson
won at trial after the district judge gave a jury instruction that was consistent
with New York case law, but that was not favorable to the principle of nego-
tiability.4 On appeal, Swift's attorney raised a novel argument that, for al-
most a century, would govern diversity cases. He argued that section 34 of
the Judiciary Act of 178942 did not require local New York law to govern the
case. 43 At the time, section 34 read, "the laws of the several states, except
where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall other-
wise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at
common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply."
44
Because Swift would stand a better chance on remand if the district court
was unconstrained by New York case law, Swift's attorney argued that by
"laws" section 34 referred only to state statutes and not to case law,45
The Supreme Court ruled in Swift's favor, reasoning that state court
decisions are not themselves laws but merely "evidence of what the laws
are." 46 Negotiable instruments, then, were held to be governed by "general
commercial law," not section 34.47 In so holding, the Court decided that
creditors in Swift's position had an absolute right of recovery.48
34. Freyer, supra note 28 at 23-24.
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 6.
38. Id. at 10-11.
39. Id. at 6.
40. Freyer, supra note 28, at 7.
41. Id. at 14.
42. 1 Stat. 92 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006)).
43. Freyer, supra note 28, at 13.
44. 1 Stat. 92 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006)). Today, the section is
referred to as the "Rules of Decision Act" and the words "trials of common law" have been
replaced with "civil actions." 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
45. Freyer, supra note 28, at 14.
46. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842).
47. Id. at 19.
48. See id. at 19-22.
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The notion of "general law," which remained the accepted view in di-
versity cases for almost a century, allowed parties to circumvent the uncer-
tainties of state courts. As long as the issue at hand was not unambiguously
governed by a state statute, federal courts were free to create their own
common law. However, because the Court had subordinated federalism to
commercial concerns, significant equitable problems arose.
2. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
Reacting to Swift, corporations began reorganizing in states with more
relaxed incorporation laws in order to artificially create diversity of citizen-
ship between themselves and local residents.49 This conduct ignited a fire-
storm among legal scholars." But the final days of the Swift doctrine came
almost a century later when twenty-seven year-old Harry Tompkins was hit
by the protruding door of an Erie Railroad Company train while walking on
a path running parallel to the tracks.51 Tompkins sued Erie for negligence in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.52
Bringing the suit in diversity was strategic in light of the Swift doctrine:
Pennsylvania state cases held that travelers on a path running parallel to
railroad tracks were trespassers,5 3 but the then-modem trend considered such
travelers licensees.54
Unfortunately for Tompkins, when the case made it to the Supreme
Court, the Court was bent on overturning Swift.55 Justice Brandeis lamented
the pervasive general practice of corporations to artificially create diversity
49. Freyer, supra note 28, at 102.
50. Id. at 105-22. Oliver Wendel Holmes, who dissented in Taxicab, wrote that judges
were "simply directors of a force that comes from the source that gives them their authority,"
that there is no "mystic overlaw" that federal judges are privy to, and that the "common law
in a state is the common law of that state deriving all its authority from the state." id. Charles
Warren, assistant attorney general under President Woodrow Wilson, pointed out that the
original draft of section 34 read "the Statute law of the several [s]tates in force for the time
being and their unwritten or common law now in use, whether by adoption from the common
law of England, the ancient statutes of the same or otherwise," rather than reading "the laws
of the several states . . . shall be regarded as rules of decision ... in cases where they apply."
Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 49, 86 (1923) (emphasis added). From this, Warren concluded that the more concise
version was a stylistic summary of the longer original. Id.
51. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 70; Freyer, supra note 28, at 124-25.
54. Erie, 304 U.S. at 70.
55. Freyer, supra note 28, at 131. During judicial conference, before Erie was decided,




jurisdiction56 and concluded that section 34 applied to more than mere stat-
utes.57 Brandeis's holding in Erie was as follows:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. And
whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a stat-
ute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal con-
cern.
58
Erie was one of the most significant decisions in the last century to al-
ter the distribution of power between the federal government and the
states.59 However, despite its emphatic holding, Erie left many important
questions unanswered.
3. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.
60
Although Erie held that the applicable law in diversity cases is state
law, it never specified which state. The Supreme Court resolved this question
in Klaxon, a diversity case initiated in the United States District Court for
the District of Delaware between a New York corporation and a Delaware
corporation. 6' Before addressing the underlying controversy, the court con-
sidered a dispute over whether New York or Delaware law should apply.62
Both the district court and United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit employed their own conflict of laws principles to determine that New
York law was applicable.63
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a federal court must follow
the conflicts rules of the state in which it sits.64 Thus, "[tihe ruling in Klaxon
allows us to restate the rule of Erie as follows: [A] federal district court sit-
ting in diversity must apply the substantive law that would have been ap-
plied had the case been filed in a court of the forum state. 65 In other words,
a district court in Arkansas does not necessarily apply Arkansas substantive
56. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-77.
57. Id. at 72-73.
58. Id. at 78.
59. 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4503 (2d ed. 1996).
60. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
61. Id. at 494.
62. Id. at 495.
63. Id. at 495-96.
64. Id. at 496.
65. Allan Ides, The Supreme Court and the Law to Be Applied in Diversity Cases: A
Critical Guide to the Development and Application of the Erie Doctrine and Related Prob-
lems, 163 F.R.D. 19, 34 (1995).
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law, but instead the substantive law that an Arkansas court would have ap-
plied.66
The twin holdings of Erie and Klaxon compel two reliable conclusions.
First, on the hierarchy of constitutional values, uniformity and predictability
lie well below federalism. 67 Attorneys attempting to anticipate the applicable
substantive law of a future lawsuit arguably must complete a four-step proc-
ess, in which they determine whether Erie would apply, establish which
states might have jurisdiction, predict the outcome of a conflict-of-laws
analysis, and ascertain the applicable state law. If uniformity and predict-
ability had any comparable value to federalism, as the Swift opinion implies,
Erie and Klaxon surely would have been resolved differently.
Second, Klaxon cemented the relationship between the forum state and
the applicable substantive law.68 Prior to Klaxon, a federal court could use
its own conflict-of-laws principles to determine which state's law to apply,
arguably attenuating the relationship between the forum state and the appli-
cable substantive law. Klaxon effectively forged a strong bond between the
forum state and the applicable substantive law, removing whatever attenua-
tion might have been present. If a case is brought in diversity, the substan-
tive law to govern the case is the entire law of the state. These two princi-
ples provide a foundation for any Erie analysis.
4. The Substance-Procedure Cases
Despite resolving the conflicts issue in Klaxon, a significant issue re-
mained. It was not clear whether Erie commanded adherence to state rules
of procedure. After all, procedural laws are still laws. Beginning with Guar-
anty Trust Co. of New York v. York,69 subsequent Erie cases struggled to
articulate a framework for determining when to apply state procedural law.
The following cases cannot be read in isolation.70 Their inconsistencies
and arguable shortcomings must be read with reference to each other be-
cause the cases "buil[t] upon and inform[ed] one another."'', The underlying
principle of the first case, Guaranty Trust, has not technically been over-
turned, but it has been considerably refined.72 Nevertheless, these cases are
66. See id.
67. See Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496. For further discussion regarding the inevitable lack of
uniformity, resulting from the holding in Klaxon, between federal courts in different states,
see WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 59, § 4506.
68. See Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
69. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
70. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 59, § 4504.
71. Id.
72. See infra Part II.A.4.b-c.
20121
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the most important in resolving whether state or federal law should apply to
the validity of forum-selection clauses.
a. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York
Guaranty Trust, like Swift, involved fraud and complicated commercial
transactions, but the sole question before the Court was whether state stat-
utes of limitation apply in diversity cases.73 Justice Frankfurter, writing for
the majority, affirmed, famously reasoning that "so far as legal rules deter-
mine the outcome of litigation," the outcome in a diversity case "should be
substantially the same" as it would have been in a state court.74
Criticizing a crude substance-or-procedure dichotomy, Frankfurter
pointed out that what is procedural in one situation might be substantive in
another.75 Instead, Frankfurter focused on whether a rule of procedure would
affect the outcome of the case. 76 This outcome-determination test had an
undeniably federalist allure. After all, federalism was the principal policy
aim of Erie.77 As Frankfurter said,
[S]ince a federal court adjudicating a state-created right solely because of
the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect,
only another court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the right to
recover is made unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect
78the enforcement of the right as given by the State.
Critical legal scholars, however, were wary of the outcome-
determination test; they were concerned that the literal limits of the test
could reach absurd dimensions since anything can theoretically affect the
outcome in a given case.79 Determining whether a rule could never, under
any circumstances, alter the outcome in a given case would require impossi-
ble hairsplitting.8 ° Even if the Guaranty Trust Court did not intend to apply
its test to its literal limits, it provided little if any guidance on how far the
test should be extended. 81 The test needed substantial elaboration, which
eventually came from the ingenuity of two famous justices.82
73. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 99-100.
74. Id. at 109.
75. Id. at 108.
76. See id. at 109.
77. See id. at 110.
78. Id. at 108-09.
79. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 59, § 4504.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See infra Part II.A.4.b-c.
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b. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.83
Byrd is the most important case in this discussion, providing the essen-
tial foundation for the conclusion that forum-selection clauses in diversity
cases should be governed by state law. Byrd began as a seemingly ordinary,
work-related negligence suit, but several issues had to be addressed before
the underlying merits of the case could be decided. First, for statutorily de-
fined "employees," South Carolina's Workmen's Compensation Act con-
fined recovery for work-related injuries to compensation benefits, and thus,
statutorily barred such employees from raising negligence claims.8 4 There-
fore, as an affirmative defense to the negligence claim, Blue Ridge asserted
that Byrd was an employee within the Act and could not sue for negli-
gence."5 Whether Byrd was in fact an employee within the statute was, how-
ever, an open question. Yet, even before this question could be resolved, the
court had to decide whether this was a question for a judge or a jury.86 The
South Carolina Supreme Court had determined that this issue should be de-
cided by a judge,87 but in federal practice, all factual questions are answered
by a jury.88 This led to the issue before the Court: Whether Erie compelled
federal courts to adhere to state jury practices-practices widely considered
procedural and, even by a conservative reading of Guaranty Trust, outcome
determinative.89
Early in the opinion, Justice Brennan reformulated the Guaranty Trust
test, which asks whether a procedural rule is outcome determinative, to in-
stead consider whether the procedural rule is "bound up" with the substan-
tive right or remedy being sought in court.90 Under this reformulation, the
mere fact that some difference in outcome could be imagined is necessary to
require application of the state law, but is not sufficient; there must also be
some "special relationship" between the procedural rule or practice and the
substantive right or remedy.9 Applying this reformulated test, the Court
83. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
84. Id. at 527.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 533.
87. Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 96 S.E.2d 566, 571 (S.C. 1957) ("It has been consis-
tently held that whether the claim of an injured workman is within the jurisdiction of the
Industrial Commission is a matter of law for decision by the court, which includes the finding
of facts which relate to jurisdiction.").
88. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537 ("An essential characteristic of [the federal] system is the
manner in which, . . . under the influence-if not the command-of the Seventh Amendment,
[it] assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury.").
89. See id. at 537 ("[W]ere 'outcome' the only consideration, a strong case might appear
for saying that the federal court should follow the state practice.").




found that "the requirement [was] merely a form and mode of enforcing [the
substantive right], and not a rule intended to be bound up with the definition
of the rights and obligations of the parties. 92
Byrd did not overturn Guaranty Trust; a party seeking to apply a state
procedural rule must still demonstrate the outcome-determinative effect of
the procedure. 93 However, by also requiring that a party show a special rela-
tionship between the procedural practice and the right or remedy being
sought, Byrd successfully eliminated the hairsplitting calculations of Guar-
anty Trust. Admittedly, Byrd never clarified what constitutes a "special rela-
tionship," but the Byrd test continues to be applicable today94-save one
significant refinement.95
c. Hanna v. Plumer
96
The defendant-respondent in Hanna was the executor of an alleged
tortfeasor's estate.97 The petitioner served the summons and complaint by
leaving copies at the executor's residence.98 Under Rule 4(d)(l) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, this would have been adequate, 99 but under
the Massachusetts rules, service was not adequate unless it was made by an
in-person delivery.'0° Here, even more so than in Byrd, the decision as to
which procedural rule to apply was outcome determinative.
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren introduced two ideas that
have since remained undisturbed. First, he affirmed the Court's observation
in Guaranty Trust "that Erie-type problems [are] not to be solved by refer-
ence to any traditional or common-sense substance-procedure distinc-
tion." °0 Warren wrote, "The 'outcome-determination' test . ..cannot be
read without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws."'
10 2
The fact that this statement has endured is surprising in light of Warren's
92. Id. (citing Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945)).
93. See id. at 537, 539-40. This proposition is evidenced in two places. First, Brennan
observed that "were 'outcome' the only consideration .... the federal court should follow the
state practice."Id. at 537 (emphasis added). Second, Brennan emphasized factors that could
reduce the possibility of an affected outcome. Id. at 539-40. It appears then that outcome
determination, while not dispositive, remains a part of the consideration.
94. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 59, § 4511.
95. See infra Part II.A.4.c.
96. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
97. Id. at 461.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 462.
101. Id. at 465-66.
102. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
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second pronouncement that Erie did not apply in Hannah at all. 3 Instead,
Warren said, when a state rule conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, the federal rule should control.' °4 This is because the accompanying
Rules Enabling Act provided,
[T]he Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules,
for the district courts of the United States and for the courts of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions,
and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall
neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any liti-
gant. 1
05
Federal courts continue to cite Hanna for the twin aims test1°6 despite
its initial use arguably being dicta. Additionally, the primary holding from
Hanna, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure trump state rules of proce-
dure, continues to stand as long as there is a "direct collision between the
[f]ederal rule and the state law. 10 7 When there is not a direction collision,
traditional Erie analysis applies.'0 8
B. Forum-Selection Clauses
Forum-selection clauses are "provision[s] in a contract [that] designate[
] a particular state or court as the jurisdiction in which the parties will liti-
gate disputes arising out of . . . their contractual relationship."'10 9 Because
they provide additional certainty should a business relationship turn sour,
they are popular in agreements between interstate or foreign parties. "o This
section provides a background on the increasingly liberal acceptance of fo-
103. Id. at 469-70.
104. ld. at 471.
105. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)).
106. E.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanties, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996) (citing Hanna,
380 U.S. at 468).
107. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 (1980) (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at
472).
108. Id. at 752-53.
109. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 259 (2011). This is not to be confused with a "choice-
of-law provision," which "names a particular state and provides that the substantial laws of
that jurisdiction will be used to determine the validity and construction of the contract, re-
gardless of any conflicts between the laws of the named state and the state in which the case
is litigated." 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 261 (2011).




rum-selection clauses,'' followed by a survey of the states' varying ap-
proaches to different forum-selection clause issues.112
1. Evolving Acceptance
Historically, forum-selection clauses were widely disfavored by
courts. 3 An oft-cited nineteenth century English case, Scott v. Avery,"l4 is
known for its declaration that "[t]here is no doubt of the general principle..
. that parties cannot by contract oust the ordinary courts of their jurisdic-
tion," '5 a principle later adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States
in 1874.116 Courts reasoned that the law prescribes the remedy in a given
case, not the contract."7 After all, because parties have no right to provide
by contract a remedy prohibited by law, the Court reasoned that parties
should neither have the right to contract away a remedy provided by law." 8
As recently as 1964, Willis L. M. Reese, reporter of the Second Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, concluded that "[i]n the United States the
effect of a choice of forum clause ... is uncertain. In the great majority of
instances, the state courts have entertained suits brought in violation of such
a clause."'' 9
This posture remained intact until the 1970s when the Supreme Court
made a sudden turnaround in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,2' which
established the modern federal standard regarding forum-selection
clauses.' 2' The Bremen was an admiralty suit arising out of a contract be-
tween Zapata, a Houston-based corporation, and Unterweser, a German cor-
poration. 22 Under the terms of their agreement, Unterweser was to tow Za-
1 11. See infra Part II.B. 1.
112. See infra Part II.B.2.
113. Willis L. M. Reese, The Contractual Forum: The Situation in the United States, 13
AM. J. COMp. L. 187, 188-89 (1964). "Judge Learned Hand once [said] that it was his guess
that this judicial aversion dates from the time when, according to him, judges were paid by
the case and accordingly viewed arbitration and choice of forum provisions as devices that
were likely to curtail their income." Id. at 189.
114. 10Eng. Rep. 1121 (1856).
115. Id. at 1135.
116. Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) ("Every citizen is
entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and to invoke the protection which all the
laws or all those courts may afford him. A man may not barter away his life or his freedom,
or his substantial rights.").
117. Id. at 452.
118. Id. at452-53.
119. Reese, supra note 113, at 187.
120. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
121. Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 291, 307 (1988).
122. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 2.
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pata's drilling rig from Louisiana to Italy, "where Zapata had agreed to drill
certain wells."'123 The contract required any dispute arising out of the agree-
ment to be resolved before the High Court of Justice in London, England. 24
A storm caused damage to Zapata's rig in the Gulf of Mexico,'25 and
Zapata, ignoring the forum-selection clause, brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida seeking to recover
damages. 26 Unterweser moved to dismiss the case, invoking the forum-
selection clause, and then brought suit in London. 127 The district court de-
nied Unterweser's motion, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.
28
In a criticized opinion, allegedly decided by "policy considerations
rather than doctrinal support,"'129 the Supreme Court vacated the Court of
Appeals' judgment. 30 In doing so, the Supreme Court created a new rule:
Forum-selection clauses are presumptively valid unless "enforcement would
be unreasonable and unjust or [unless] the clause [is] invalid for such rea-
sons as fraud or overreaching."' 13' Most prominent among the Court's con-
siderations were "commercial realities," which expand international trade
and international parties' need for the assurance of a neutral forum for dis-
pute resolution. 3 2 Additionally, the Court regarded enforcement of forum-
selection clauses as in accord with "freedom of contract."' 133 Applying these
rules to the facts of The Bremen, the Court noted that the two parties were
sophisticated businessmen,134 the contract was not established by fraud,'35
most witnesses in maritime cases are deposed anyway, 36 and England had a
well-established body of maritime jurisprudence.3 7 Therefore, the Court
ruled in Unterweser's favor.1
38
The policy justifications for the Court's ruling were consistent with its
maritime nature.'39 It is questionable, however, whether the same justifica-
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id. at 3-4.
127. Id. at 4.
128. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 6-7.
129. Mullenix, supra note 121, at 312.
130. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 20.
131. Id. at 10, 15.
132. Id. at 11-12, 15.
133. Id. at l.
134. Id. at 12.
135. Id. at 12-13.
136. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 19.
137. Id. at 12.
138. Id. at 15.
139. See Mullenix, supra note 121, at 313.
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tions are present in domestic cases.1 40 While there certainly exist insecurities
in the American federal system, they pale in comparison to those of the in-
ternational legal setting.' 4' Despite this, "federal courts [have] routinely and
uncritically import[ed] The Bremen's rule on forum-selection clauses into
the full range of domestic federal cases. 142
Most states have followed federal courts in abandoning the traditional
approach to forum-selection clauses. 143 Many have even appropriated the
language of The Bremen or substantially similar language.'" Nevertheless,
as will be discussed below, there are subtle, yet significant differences in
states' interpretations of The Bremen. 1
45
2. Forum-Selection Clauses in State Courts
This section will briefly address the unique ways in which different
states evaluate the validity of forum-selection clauses. This section is by no
means exhaustive and need not be. A mere acknowledgment that states dif-
fer in their treatment of forum-selection clauses suffices for present pur-
poses.
To begin, states are split regarding the enforceability of forum-
selection clauses when the contractually designated state would deny the
plaintiff a particular cause of action or remedy. For example, the Florida
District Court of Appeal for the Third District enforced a forum-selection
clause in a class action breach of contract suit 146 despite the fact that the
clause designated Virginia, a state that does not recognize class actions, as
the appropriate forum. 147 The court effectively deprived the plaintiffs of a
class action remedy by requiring the parties to move their suit to Virginia.
148
On the other hand, in an essentially identical case, the Washington Supreme
Court held the opposite. 149 The court refused to enforce a forum-selection
140. Id. at 313-14.
141. See id. at 314 (reasoning that "the continued vitality of international law in large
measure depends on consensual relationships" since there is no sovereign).
142. Id. at314,314n.88.
143. See, e.g., Gen. Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 358 (3d
Cir. 1986) (citing many cases that have been influenced by the Supreme Court's decision in
The Bremen).
144. See Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts: Limitations on
Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 553, 603 (1993).
145. See infra Part II.B.2.
146. Am. Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
147. Id. at 424.
148. See id.
149. Dix v. ICT. Grp., Inc., 161 P.3d 1016, 1022 (Wash. 2007).
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clause in a class action suit because the designated state-again Virginia-
did not recognize class actions.' °
Additionally, states consider different factors in determining whether a
forum-selection clause is reasonable. Alabama, for example, considers the
following five factors:
1. whether "the parties are business entities or businesspersons;"''
2. "the subject matter of the contract;"
' 152
3. whether "the chosen forum has any inherent advantages;"'
153
4. whether "the parties have been able to understand the agreement as it
was written;"' 5 4 and
5. whether "extraordinary facts have arisen since the agreement was en-
tered that would make the chosen forum seriously inconvenient.
1 55
Illinois courts, on the other hand, consider a different set of factors:
1. "which law governs the formation and construction of the con-
tract;"
56
2. "the residency of the parties involved;"'
' 57
3. "the place of execution and/or performance of the contract;" 158
4. "the location of the parties and witnesses participating in the litiga-
tion;"' 59
5. "the inconvenience to the parties of any particular location;"'' 60 and
6. "whether the clause was equally bargained for."'
16'
Whereas Alabama seems to emphasize the characteristics of the parties
and the subject matter, Illinois seems more concerned with logistical consid-
erations.
Next, courts following The Bremen would clearly invalidate a forum-
selection clause for fraud,162 but states are deeply split over several issues of
fraud. Even when states agree regarding what constitutes fraud, they do not
always agree as to the situations in which fraud is relevant. For example, in
150. Id. at 1019, 1022 ("[A] forum selection clause that seriously impairs a plaintiffs
ability to bring suit to enforce the [Consumer Protection Act] violates the public policy of this
state.").












162. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
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many states, it is not sufficient for a party to demonstrate fraud in the in-
ducement of the contract as a whole in order for the court to invalidate the
forum-selection clause. 163 Rather, the specific clause designating the forum
must itself have been obtained by fraud."6 On the other hand, Texas courts
adhere to a rule that where the asserted wrong is fraud in the inducement
and not a general breach, the "remedies and limitations specified by the con-
tract do not apply. ' 165 The effect of this rule is that "Texas courts will not
apply forum selection clauses to tort actions alleging fraud in the induce-
ment." 166 The Texas rule might invite courts to disregard forum-selection
clauses more frequently than might be expected in other states.
Finally, some jurisdictions continue to reject forum-selection clauses as
a matter of law. Idaho declares forum-selection clauses void by statute.'67
Similarly, Montana statutorily invalidates forum-selection clauses except
upon the advice of counsel as evidenced by counsel's signature on the
agreement. 168 While most states utilize some reasonableness-fraud-
overreaching inquiry, 169 fringe states such as Montana and Idaho continue to
adhere to the traditional view.
These aforementioned examples are but a few of the varied approaches
to forum-selection clauses. Even though most state courts have appropriated
much of the language from The Bremen,7° that language constitutes a mere
starting point. As has been shown, states apply that language in remarkably
different ways. The existence of these differences is crucial to the Erie
analysis in Part III of this note.' 7'
C. Application of the Erie Doctrine to Forum-Selection Clauses
Having provided a background on the most relevant Erie and forum-
selection clause cases, this section will discuss the controversy over Erie's
specific application to forum-selection clauses. The Erie issue presented by
diversity jurisdiction is the most perplexing issue raised by forum-selection
cases in federal courts.'72 As will be shown, courts uniformly hold that fed-
eral law should govern forum-selection clauses in diversity cases, but a mi-
163. Karty v. Mid-America Energy, Inc., 903 N.E.2d 1131, 1135 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009).
164. Id.
165. Busse v. Pac. Cattle Feeding Fund No. 1, Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Ct. App.
1995).
166. S.W. Intelecom, Inc. v. Hotel Networks Corp., 997 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. Ct. App.
1999).
167. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 29-110(1) (2010).
168. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-323 (2011).
169. See 7 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:15 (4th ed. 2010).
170. See id.
171. See infra Part III.B.
172. Mullenix, supra note 121, at 332.
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nority formerly held that state law should control them.173 Both sides' analy-
ses, however, are subject to substantial criticism.
1. The Current Consensus
a. Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. 
174
Containing a discussion of the Ricoh case to the Supreme Court's opin-
ion is not feasible. 75 The difficulty stems from the fact that the Supreme
Court effectively created a second holding when it refrained the issue that
had been decided by the Eleventh Circuit.7 6 In Ricoh, the Stewart Organiza-
tion, an Alabama corporation, entered into a dealership agreement with the
Ricoh Corporation. 7 7 The contract contained forum-selection and choice-of-
law provisions, designating New York's law as operative and New York
City as the appropriate forum.178 Thus, when Stewart later sued in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, alleging breach
of contract, breach of warranty, fraud, and antitrust violations, Ricoh moved
to transfer to New York or, in the alternative, to dismiss.'79
At the time Ricoh was decided, Alabama courts invalidated forum-
selection clauses as a matter of law, 180 and at trial, the court applied the Ala-
bama rule rather than the liberal federal rule from The Bremen.'8' On appeal,
however, the Eleventh Circuit reversed.1
82
i. Eleventh Circuit Opinion
The Eleventh Circuit's Ricoh opinion is often cited as the genesis of the
majority view even though its reasoning was not adopted by the Supreme
173. See infra Parts III.C.1-2.
174. 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
175. In a London broadcast in 1939, Winston Churchill described Russia as "a riddle,
wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma." NEVER GIVE IN!: THE BEST OF WINSTON
CHURCHILL'S SPEECHES 199 (Winston S. Churchill, ed. 2003). The Supreme Court certainly
made analysis of forum-selection clauses an enigma, which, coming from the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, was already a riddle, wrapped in a mystery.
176. Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22, 29. See also infra note 183 and accompanying text.
177. Ricoh, 810 F.2d at 1067.
178. Id. at 1067, 1070.
179. See id. at 1070.
180. Id. at 1067, 1069. See also Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554, 556
(Ala. 1980), overruled by Prof'l Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347 (Ala. 1997) ("We
consider contract provisions which attempt to limit the jurisdiction of the courts of this state
to be invalid and unenforceable as being contrary to public policy.").
181. Ricoh, 810 F.2d at 1067.
182. Id. at 1071.
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Court. 83 The court found that Hanna should apply not only when a state law
conflicts with the Federal Rules of Procedure, but should also apply anytime
there is conflict between a state law and a federal statute relating to federal
procedure.184 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that, because Congress had en-
acted rules of venue,'85 federal law should resolve all questions of venue,
such as the validity of forum-selection clauses. 8 6 This reasoning, however,
runs contrary to Hanna.
In the court's Erie discussion, it created a new rule that contradicted
Hanna and then misapplied its own rule. The explicit basis of Hanna' s hold-
ing was that the Rules Enabling Act preempted the Erie Doctrine.8 8 Be-
cause the Rules Enabling Act applies only to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, it was wrong to apply Hanna in this case because it did not involve
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But even assuming this rule does not
conflict with Hanna, it is irrelevant: Ricoh-like virtually every forum-
selection clause case in federal court-involved a conflict between compet-
ing court decisions, not venue statutes. 88 Despite the court's insistence that
"Congress . . . specifically provided ...rules of venue to govern federal
district courts in diversity actions,"'' 89 it applied none of them and instead
applied The Bremen.'90 Therefore, Hanna's command regarding the Rules
Enabling Act should have had no application.
After its treatment of Hanna, the court claimed that The Bremen was
instructive because forum-selection clauses are gaining in acceptance.' ' In
other words, the court subordinated federalism to commercial expediency
183. See, e.g., Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512 (9th Cir.
1988).
184. Ricoh, 810 F.2d at 1068.
185. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1413 (2006).
186. Ricoh, 810 F.2d at 1068.
187. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
188. One author noted:
The majority inappropriately lumped all existing federal venue rules together to preempt the
application of a state rule which relates to, but does not control venue, thereby bootstrapping
the arguably procedural venue rules up to the level of a Hanna directly applicable procedural
rule. The majority's discussion fails to heed the warning in Hanna not to read federal proce-
dural rules too broadly and also gives courts the green light to disregard state rules, thus
contravening Erie.
Julia L. Erickson, Comment, Forum Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine and
Federal Common Law: Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corporation, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1090,
1108-09 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
189. Ricoh, 810 F.2d at 1068.
190. Id. at 1069. The court stated: "Applying federal law to this question, the inquiry is
whether the forum selection clause in this case is unenforceable under the standards set forth




and state-to-state uniformity-a stark retreat from the values of Erie back to
those of Swift.
ii. Supreme Court opinion'92
The Eleventh Circuit's Ricoh opinion has been subject to numerous
criticisms, but its holding was clear. Clarity, however, could hardly charac-
terize the opinion handed down by the Supreme Court.' 93 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit unsurprisingly framed the issue as whether the validity of forum-
selection clauses should be determined by federal law or by state law.' 94
Justice Marshall, however, reframed the issue in his opinion, deciding in-
stead "whether [28 U.S.C.] § 1404(a) 95 itself controls respondent's request
to give effect to the parties' contractual choice of venue."' 96 Citing a vague
notion of the "supremacy of federal law," the majority concluded that it
did. 197 What exactly that means, however, was left to speculation.
A cursory reading of the majority opinion suggests that The Bremen
does not determine the validity of forum-selection clauses in diversity cases.
After all, Marshall wrote: "Although we agree with the Court of Appeals
that the Bremen case may prove 'instructive' in resolving the parties' dis-
pute, we disagree with the court's articulation of the relevant inquiry as
'whether the forum selection clause in this case is unenforceable under the
standards set forth in The Bremen."'9 8 According to Marshall, the court
should instead determine whether a balance of any number of factors would
compel the transfer according to "an 'individualized, case-by-case consid-
eration of convenience and fairness."" 99 In other words, one might say §
1404(a) is not merely the authorization for transfer, it is the governor.
However, this interpretation is problematic. In his dissent, Justice
Scalia argued that § 1404(a) concerns itself with factors in the present and
future, whereas forum-selection clause analysis concerns itself with factors
as they existed at the time the contract was formed.2°° Furthermore, given
that any application of § 1404(a) to forum-selection clauses originated from
192. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
193. See Mullenix, supra note 121, at 334-39.
194. Ricoh, 810F.2dat 1067.
195. "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought .... 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
196. Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 29.
197. Id. at 29, 31.
198. Id. at 28-29 (internal citations omitted).
199. Id. at 29 (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). Some factors
mentioned included the presence of a forum-selection clause, convenience of the parties, the
policy of the forum state, and other considerations. Id. at 29-31.
200. See id. at 34-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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this judge-made rule, the question of which federal law to apply should be
secondary to the question of whether federal law should apply at all.2°'
In addition, and most significantly, using § 1404(a) allows, if not in-
vites, forum shopping. The Court held in Van Dusen v. Barrack0 2 that when
cases are transferred pursuant to § 1404(a), "the transferee district court
must ... apply the state law that would have been applied if there had been
no change in venue."20 3 For example, if a plaintiff in diversity brings suit in
state A and the defendant, pursuant to § 1404(a), successfully transfers the
case to state B, state B must then apply the law of state A. 2°" The court rea-
soned "that the 'accident' of federal diversity jurisdiction [should] not en-
able a party to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court which
could not have been achieved in the courts of the [s]tate where the action
was filed."20 5
However, if Ricoh indeed requires that all forum-selection clause dis-
putes be governed solely by and transferred according to § 1404(a), Van
Dusen would inevitably compel the following perverse hypothetical. Sup-
pose a particular contract designates state A as the sole forum, but the law of
state B would be more favorable to the plaintiff. In order to avoid the law of
state A, the plaintiff could bring suit in state B, and if the defendant moved
to enforce the forum-selection clause and transfer the case to state A, the
courts in state A, abiding by Van Dusen, would be forced to apply the law of
state B. Thus, regardless of whether the court would enforce the forum-
selection clause, the law of state B would be applied.
This is quintessential forum shopping, striking at the heart of every-
thing Erie intended to prevent. Such was not lost on the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Texas in Hoffman v. Burroughs
Corp.,2"6 however. In deciding whether to transfer pursuant to § 1404(a) or §
1406(a),07 the court identified the problem acutely: "The statutory selection
may be more than academic. The statutory basis for transfer in a diversity of
citizenship case may determine what the applicable law is, including
whether the choice of law rules of the state of the transferee court or the
transferor court apply., 20 8 It then pointed out that the language of § 1406(a)
201. Id. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
203. Id. at 639.
204. See id.
205. Id. at 638.
206. 571 F. Supp. 545 (1982).
207. "The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong
division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any
district or division in which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Importantly,
Van Dusen does not apply to § 1406. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 634.
208. Hoffman, 571 F. Supp. at 550 (citing Ellis v. Great Sw. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1109
(5th Cir. 1981). The court also seemed to suggest that 28 U.S.C. § 1391 does not control
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is more appropriate to forum-selection clause transfers where the suit is ini-
tially brought in the wrong court, a different inquiry than the § 1404(a) con-
sideration of convenience.2°
Before Ricoh was decided, cases were split regarding whether forum-
selection clauses should be enforced pursuant to § 1404(a) or § 1406(a). If
Ricoh had authoritatively declared § 1404(a) to be the sole arbiter in forum-
selection cases, then courts would have discontinued invoking § 1406(a).
Yet, even after Ricoh, attorneys and judges invoke § 1404(a), § 1406(a), and
Rule 12(b) alike.210 As the following majority-view cases suggest, it is
doubtful whether Ricoh has any enduring meaning at all.
b. Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc.2"
Gucci was a suit arising out of a dealership agreement between
Manetti-Farrow and Gucci America.2 12 The contract provided, "For any con-
troversy regarding interpretation or fulfillment of the present contract, the
Court of Florence has sole jurisdiction."'2 13 A power struggle ensued, and
Gucci terminated the agreement and brought suit in Italy, alleging breach of
contract, whereupon Manetti-Farrow brought suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California, alleging several tortious
interference claims.2 14 The district court dismissed the case, and Manetti-
Farrow appealed.1 5
The Ninth Circuit panel held that the forum-selection clause was en-
forceable. 16 Its justification sheds light on the Supreme Court's decision in
Ricoh. The panel reasoned that, because a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss
was made rather than a § 1404(a) motion to transfer, the Ricoh opinion in
the Supreme Court did not apply.217 Instead, the court cited the Eleventh
when venue is wrong in the first instance. Id. at 551 (citing 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3847 (1st
ed. 1982)).
209. Hoffman, 571 F. Supp. at 550-51.
210. See TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 647 F.3d 472, 478-79 (2d Cir. 2011)
(transferring pursuant to Rule 12(b) and rejecting the argument "that a district court is ...
required to enforce a forum-selection clause only by transferring a case pursuant to §
1404(a)"); Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 875 (3d Cir. 1995) (transferring on
appeal pursuant to § 1404(a), after the district court had ruled to transfer pursuant to §
1406(a)); Lemoine v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 854 F. Supp. 447,448 (E.D. La. 1994) (transfer-
ring pursuant to § 1406(a)); see also Mullenix, supra note 121, at 327-29.






217. Gucci, 858 F.2d at 512 n.2.
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Circuit's Ricoh opinion and applied virtually identical reasoning.218 As a
result, Gucci importantly nullifies any notion that Ricoh declared § 1404(a)
to be the sole arbiter in federal forum-selection cases. The following case
reinforces this point.
c. Jones v. Weibrecht' 9
In 1989, Nettie Jones commenced suit against Edwin Weibrecht in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, seeking
to rescind two agreements related to the sale of certain stocks.22 "Both
agreements contain[ed] identical forum-selection clauses, designating the
Supreme Court of New York, Essex County, as the exclusive venue for any
action between the parties on the basis of the agreements., 22' The district
court remanded the case to the state court, citing the forum-selection clause,
and Jones appealed.222
The Second Circuit acknowledged the holding in Ricoh but, without
explanation, decided that a broad § 1404(a) standard is inappropriate "where
... a party seeks to have an action dismissed or remanded to a state court,
rather than transferred. '223 The court further noted that it and other circuits
have continued to apply The Bremen in diversity cases even after Ricoh. 
24
d. TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc.
225
In TradeComet.com, TradeComet.com sued Google in New York for
alleged anti-competitive activity in violation of the Sherman Act.2 6 The
agreement between the two companies, however, contained a forum-
selection clause, which specified Santa Clara County, California as the ap-
propriate forum.227 Accordingly, "Google filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and improper venue, pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.,
228
TradeComet.com, invoking the typical Ricoh argument, contended that
a district court may enforce a forum-selection clause pursuant to § 1404(a)
only. 9 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
218. Id. at 512-13.
219. 901 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1990).
220. Id. at 18.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 19.
224. Id.
225. 647 F.3d 472 (2d Cir. 2011).
226. Id. at 474.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 474-75.
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cuit disagreed.23° The court pointed out that a variety of procedural mecha-
nisms are available for enforcing forum-selection clauses.23' It then re-
markably stated that "[w]e have noted, however, that neither the Supreme
Court, nor this Court, has 'specifically designated a single clause of Rule
12(b)'-or an alternative vehicle-' as the proper procedural mechanism to




The court then explicitly held that § 1404(a) is not the only vehicle for en-
forcing forum-selection clauses.233
Gucci, Weibrecht, and TradeComet.com have chipped away at the Ri-
coh case, compelling a conclusion that § 1404(a) did not replace The Bre-
men. Instead, these cases suggest a narrow and circular true holding from
Ricoh: § 1404(a) is the appropriate standard for evaluating forum-selection
clauses when a transfer is appropriate pursuant to § 1404(a). Consequently,
because it is questionable as to when a § 1404(a) transfer is appropriate, if
ever in forum-selection disputes, it is likewise unclear as to when Ricoh is
applicable.
Another twist further complicates this manifestly unhelpful formula.234
State courts apply two steps in forum-selection clause analysis.235 First,
courts apply general contract principles, such as fraud, duress, overreaching,
and other such principles, in order to determine "validity. '236 Second, courts
consider principles of unfairness, unreasonableness, and public policy to
determine the "enforceability" of the clause.237 This suggests that, because
there is only scant language on point in § 1404(a), Ricoh's test only applies
to enforceability, and state contract law best resolves the validity test.238 At
least one author has asserted that the "convenience of the parties" language
of § 1404(a) is broad enough to cover principles of unfairness, unreason-
ableness, and public policy.239 But this logic is questionable at best because
these principles involve much more than mere "convenience." Nevertheless,
the contention that Ricoh did not clearly differentiate between the aspects of
validity and enforceability is undeniably sound, as evidenced by Gucci and
230. Id. at 478-79.
231. TradeComet.com, 647 F.3d at 475.
232. Id. (citing Asoma Corp. v. SK Shipping Co., 467 F.3d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 2006) (em-
phasis added).
233. Id. at 478 ("For these reasons, we reaffirm our prior precedents and hold that a dis-
trict court is not require to enforce a forum selection clause only by transferring a case pursu-
ant to § 1404(a) when that clause specifies that suit may be brought in an alternative federal
forum.").
234. Heiser, supra note 144, at 575.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 574-75.
237. Id. at 574-76.
238. Id. at 576-77.
239. Id. at 576.
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Weibrecht. Consequently, it is unclear when and to what extent the Supreme
Court's opinion in Ricoh applies. Given these deficiencies, a more doctri-
nally sound approach is needed and such an approach will be discussed in
Part 11I, following the discussion of the former minority view.240
2. The Former Minority View
The minority view, which has since been abandoned, diverted from the
majority at the very outset of the Erie analysis. 24' Rather than engaging in
any discussion about the Rules of Decision Act, Rules Enabling Act, or
venue statutes, the minority simply held that forum-selection clauses are
matters of contract law, are substantive rather than procedural, and therefore
should be governed by state law.242 This view was espoused by the Third
Circuit in General Engineering Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc. ,243 as
well as by Justice Scalia in his Ricoh dissent.24
In Martin, Justice Hunter, writing for the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit, began by characterizing the issue as one of con-
tract construction.2 45 Then he said that The Bremen was based in admiralty,
and therefore, its power to create federal common law was limited.246 By
implication then, whether other courts choose to import The Bremen is dis-
cretionary. Next, the court, quoting Erie, claimed that there was not a suffi-
ciently "strong federal interest or policy that would displace state law in the
present case.,, 247 This is certainly true so far as contract construction goes,
but the court assumes that forum-selection clause controversies concern
contract construction and not venue. The court characterized the controversy
in this way without further explanation.
Justice Scalia, who reached the same conclusion in his dissenting opin-
ion in Ricoh, claimed that Hanna's twin aims test-discouragement of fo-
rum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws-was
the test to differentiate between substance and procedure.248 He then pointed
out that the rule from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals encourages
240. See infra Part III.B.
241. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33-41 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); Gen. Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc. 783 F.2d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 1986).
242. Id.
243. See Martin, 783 F.2d at 357. The Third Circuit no longer follows the minority view.
See Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 883 (3d Cir. 1994).
244. See Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 33-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
245. Martin, 783 F.2d at 356.
246. Id. at 356-57.
247. Id. at 357 ("[F]ederal jurisdiction alone does not create a sufficiently strong federal
policy to deny the application of state law.").
248. Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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forum shopping, 249 and from these premises, Scalia implicitly concluded that
forum-selection clauses are substantive. °
The Erie Court was certainly concerned with the twin aims identified
in Hanna, but it is a stretch to say, as Scalia did, that Hanna, let alone Erie,
concerned substance-procedure distinctions. The law at issue in Hanna was
unambiguously procedural, and the law at issue in Erie was unambiguously
substantive."' Thus, the twin aims test was not the appropriate test in Ricoh,
regardless of how well Scalia may have applied it.
In sum, the majority and minority approaches alike are prone to ques-
tionable applications of Erie, Byrd, Hanna, and § 1404(a). Consequently,
Erie cases in the forum-selection context have been made unnecessarily
confusing and doctrinally unsound, and many of the policy aims of Erie
have been thwarted. In an attempt to correct these problems, this note pro-
poses an analysis that holds more true to Erie and its progeny.
25 2
III. ANALYSIS
Justice Frankfurter was prescient enough to appreciate the deficiencies
of a pure substance-procedure dichotomy,253 even if his outcome-
determination test had to be tweaked over the years. Despite Justice Frank-
furter's warning, courts have been content with the sole inquiry as to
whether forum-selection clauses are substantive or procedural. 4 Unfortu-
nately, Erie analysis is not content with this inquiry25 : Guaranty Trust,
Byrd, and Hanna compel the conclusion that, while critical, the substance-
procedure question is just the beginning of the Erie analysis.
This section will apply a more faithful and complete Erie analysis of
forum-selection clauses than has been demonstrated in federal courts. Of
course, the inquiry begins with the substance-procedure question, which will
constitute the first part of this section.256 The second part will complete the




250. Id. at 39-41.
251. In Erie, the underlying legal issue was whether an individual walking along a path
parallel to train tracks is a licensee or a trespasser. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
70 (1938). In Hanna, the underlying legal issue was whether leaving copies of summons at an
executor's residence is adequate service. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 461-62 (1965).
252. See infra Part III.
253. See Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
254. See supra Part II.C.
255. See supra Part II.A.
256. See infra Part III.A.
257. See infra Part III.B.
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A. The Validity of Forum-Selection Clauses Is a Question of Procedure
While the minority has reached the correct outcome, the majority be-
gins with the correct premise: The validity of forum-selection clauses is a
question of procedure. This conclusion is based on critical legal scholarship
and early cases.
1. A Substance-Procedure Paradigm More In Touch With Reality
Justice Reed's concurrence in Erie got right to the heart of the modem
problem: "The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy .... ,,258
Justice Frankfurter elaborated,
Matters of "substance" and matters of "procedure" are much talked about
in the books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the
whole domain of law. But, of course, "substance" and "procedure" are
the same key-words to very different problems. Neither "substance" nor
"procedure" represents the same invariants. Each implies different vari-
ables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used. And
the different problems are only distantly related at best, for the terms are
in common use in connection with situations turning on such different
considerations as those that are relevant to questions pertaining to ex
post facto legislation, the impairment of the obligations of contract, the
enforcement of federal rights in the State courts and the multitudinous
phases of the conflict of laws.
2 59
Professor Lawrence Solum identified the problem using an ingenious
thought experiment.26 Solum describes an imaginary world in which there is
a cone of silence between the government and the citizenry.26' In this world,
the government is bound by, among other things, the Code of Adjudica-
tion,262 whereas a Code of Conduct binds citizens-but the citizens have no
knowledge of anything inside the cone of silence that encloses the govern-
ment, including the Code of Adjudication.263 Only three things pass through
the cone of silence: the Code of Conduct (going out); "information relevant
to particular legal disputes" (going in); and judgments (going out).
26
It is easy to distinguish substantive law from procedural law with this
experiment. Substantive law is comprised of the rules that exist outside the
258. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring).
259. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (internal citations
omitted).
260. Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 206-14 (2004).
261. Id. at 207.
262. Id. at 207, 211.
263. Id. at 207, 210-11.
264. Id. at 207.
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cone of silence, whereas procedural law consists of the rules that exist inside
the cone of silence. 265 Thus, the inherent difficulty in distinguishing sub-
stance from procedure is diminished.266 In the real world, the lack of a cone
of silence causes substance and procedure to become entangled
267 -
procedures are used for substantive purposes and vice-versa.268
Some laws are clearly procedural or substantive; the reasonable person
standard in negligence cases has never been confused as procedural, and
service of process is clearly not substantive.2 69 But there also is an unmistak-
able gray area.270 Fortunately, Professor Solum has suggested a more sophis-
ticated model for classifying laws in the gray area. Solum suggests that there
should be four classifications of laws having characteristics of both sub-
stance and procedure: substantive procedure, of which he identifies two
types, and procedural substance, of which he also identifies two types.27'
Type one substantive-procedure laws (SPI) are "procedural rules with
intentionally substantive functions. 272 The parol evidence rule is a classic
example.273 In form, the parol evidence rule is a rule of evidence, but in
function it is a rule meant to regulate the conduct of parties to a contract.
274
This is illustrated by Solum's thought experiment.2 5 In his imaginary world,
the parol evidence rule, being a rule of evidence, would be part of the Code
of Adjudication as a procedural rule, and in the Code of Conduct as a sub-
stantive rule.276 In Solum's imaginary world and in the real world, contract-
ing parties are aware of the parol evidence rule and, thus, conform their pri-
mary conduct-that is, conduct outside the adjudicatory process 277-to the
rule.
Type two substantive-procedure laws (SP2) are "particularized conduct
rules. 27 SP2s are mechanisms that "take a general legal rule and apply it to
a particular factual context" and "can resolve a dispute by guiding primary
conduct. 27 9 An injunction is a good example of a SP2.28° Injunctions are
265. See id.
266. See Solum, supra note 260, at 213-14.
267. Id. at 215.
268. Id. at 216.
269. See id. at 216, 221.
270. See id.
271. Id. at215-22.




276. Id. at 216-17.
277. Solum, supra note 260, at 204.
278. Id. at 219.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 220.
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undoubtedly procedural mechanisms-a private citizen cannot issue one.
However, their function is to apply some general substantive rule to a par-
ticular context and, thus, alter the primary conduct of individuals. 28' Like
SP Is, SP2s are procedural in form and substantive in function.
Type one procedural-substance laws (PS1) are "formal conduct rules
with intentionally procedural functions.' ' 82 These laws are substantive in
form but are created to serve the adjudicatory system.283 Examples include
laws "prohibiting obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and destruction
of evidence., 284 PS Is undoubtedly alter the primary conduct of individuals
but have a purpose of serving the administration of justice.285
Lastly, type two procedural-substance laws (PS2) are "particularized
decision rules., 286 "[T]hey are procedures that transform the abstract and
general principles of substantive law into concrete and particular guidelines
for deliberation. 2 87 Examples include judgment as a matter of law and jury
instructions.2 88 Like PSIs, PS2s are substantive in form, but procedural in
function.
Perhaps future jurists will better conform the Erie analysis to these re-
alities. However, the purpose of this note is not to suggest an alternative to
the Erie doctrine but rather to apply it more faithfully, and, despite its short-
comings, the Erie analysis begins with the substance-procedure dichotomy.
To reconcile this crude dichotomy with legal and practical realities, judges
should give less consideration to the form of a law than to its intended func-
tion. Thus, laws with procedural functions (PSls and PS2s) should be
treated as "procedural," and laws with substantive functions (SPIs and
SP2s) should be treated as "substantive."
Rules governing forum-selection clauses are characterized by qualities
common to SPIs and PSIs. Like SPIs, forum-selection clauses are proce-
dural rules that undoubtedly alter conduct. For example, contract drafters in
Montana are less likely to include forum-selection clauses because Montana
has declared them invalid. But it does not follow that Montana enacted its
rule to alter primary conduct. After all, there is no penalty for including a
forum-selection clause; the clause will simply not be enforced. Had the in-
tent of the Montana legislature been to deter drafters from including forum-
selection clauses, the law probably would have been written as follows: "It
shall be punishable by law for a contractual agreement to include a provi-
281. Id. at 219.
282. Id. at 221.




287. Id. at 222.
288. Id. at 221-22.
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sion designating the venue for adjudication." By punishing the inclusion of a
forum-selection clause, regulation of primary conduct would clearly have
been the intent of the law. However, being that the regulation of primary
conduct is probably not the intent of rules governing forum-selection
clauses, classification of such rules as SPIs is not proper.
Forum-selection clauses should be classified as PSis. First, even
though they are found in contracts, giving the appearance of a substantive
law issue, the aim of rules governing forum-selection clauses is more to
serve the adjudicatory system than to alter primary conduct. The modem
rules of forum-selection gravitate around the idea of procedural fairness.
Second, it is hard to imagine that when a party contemplates their obliga-
tions under a contract, forum selection is among them. Forum selection is an
issue that typically arises only after the initiation of a lawsuit. These two
considerations, based on the Solum model, weigh heavily towards a deter-
mination that forum-selection clauses are procedural in nature.
2. History
In addition to modern critical analysis, the earliest treatment of forum-
selection clauses in English and American courts supports the conclusion
that they are procedural. Certainly, courts never directly addressed the ques-
tion, but this understanding is implicit in their aversion to forum-selection
clauses.
The central premise of the Lord Chancellor's opinion in Scott v. Avery
was: "[P]arties cannot by contract oust the ordinary courts of their jurisdic-
tion. '289 if forum-selection clauses were merely substantive provisions creat-
ing rights, duties, and remedies among the parties, courts would not have
feared loss of jurisdiction. But Justice Hunt made it clear that was not the
case: "Every citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and
to invoke the protection which all the laws or all those courts may afford
him. ' 290 Further, and arguably even more on point, "parties have no more
right to enter into stipulations against a resort to the courts for their remedy
in a given case than they have to provide a remedy prohibited by law."29'
Illegal remedies and forum-selection clauses were similar in that they would
not be enforced. They differed, however, in the bodies of law that they con-
travened. Illegal remedies were repugnant to substantive contract principles;
forum-selection clauses were repugnant to procedural considerations of ju-
risdiction and venue.
289. 10Eng. Rep. 1121 (1856).




Therefore, history, in addition to modem critical analysis, lends support
to the notion that forum-selection clauses are best classified as procedural.
B. State Law Should Govern the Validity of Forum-Selection Clauses in
Erie Cases
Having concluded that rules governing forum-selection clauses are
procedural, we find ourselves in the same position as that of the parties in
Byrd and Hanna. The question then, according to Byrd, is whether rules
governing forum-selection clauses are bound up with the underlying rights
and remedies of contracts-specifically whether these rules are outcome
determinative and whether they possess a special relationship to those rights
and remedies. First, despite some commentary to the contrary,292 the rules
governing forum-selection clauses are outcome determinative. Second, these
procedural rules possess a special relationship to substantive contract law.
The outcome-determinative nature and special relationship of forum-
selection clause rules to substantive contract law are readily apparent when
framed in light of Byrd's qualifications to the outcome-determination test of
Guaranty Trust. As previously mentioned, Guaranty Trust was concerned
with unnecessarily applying state procedural law in diversity cases, and
Byrd was a reaction to the impracticability of the Guaranty Trust test. Byrd
did not overturn Guaranty Trust; it merely refined it. Outcome determina-
tion is still good law, subject to Byrd's qualifications.
The potential for outcome determination in the immediate context
stems from the possibility that a change of forum could bring a change in
law. Because this analysis is tricky, one must remember that Erie's value is
federalism, not simplicity. According to Klaxon, federal courts must apply
the prevailing conflict-of-laws doctrine of the state in which they sit.
293
However, the question of which conflict-of-laws doctrine to apply depends
on the validity of the forum-selection clause.
For example, suppose that a particular forum-selection clause is con-
tested in a case brought in state A, and that state A, applying The Bremen's
standard, would for some reason require a transfer from state A to state B. In
that case, if the court properly transfers pursuant to § 1406(a), the conflicts
doctrine of state B would determine the substantive law. On the other hand,
suppose the court instead uses the state standard and suppose that state A's
standard would for some reason invalidate the same forum-selection clause
as above, keeping the case in state A. In that case, adherence to Klaxon
292. Eric Fahlman, Note, Forum-Selection Clauses: Should State or Federal Law Deter-
mine Validity in Diversity Actions?-Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct.
2239 (1988), 64 WASH. L. REv. 439, 453 (1989).
293. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,496 (1941).
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would require use of state A's conflict-of-laws doctrine to determine the
substantive law. Because the question as to whether the state or federal stan-
dard is applied can determine, in turn, which conflict-of-laws doctrine will
be applied, a concrete possibility exists that rules governing forum-selection
clauses are outcome determinative.
An argument has be made that forum-selection clauses are not outcome
determinative, however, based on the following syllogism: If Ricoh held that
§ 1404(a) categorically governs forum-selection clauses and if Van Dusen
held that transfers pursuant to § 1404(a) must retain the law of the transfer-
ring forum, then forum-selection clauses are not outcome determinative
because a transfer would not lead to a change in law.294
This syllogism presents three problems. First, Ricoh's holding is too
flimsy to be decisive here. As shown earlier, courts today continue to trans-
fer and dismiss pursuant to statutes other than § 1404(a), such as § 1406(a)
and Rule 12(b)(3),295 and, even when transferring under § 1404(a), many
courts use the Bremen test for forum-selection validity anyway. 296 As long
as a reliable holding from Ricoh is so elusive, it should not stand as a bed-
rock principle that forum-selection clauses are not outcome determinative.
Second, there are strong arguments to suggest that Ricoh was incor-
rectly decided. 297 By the plain language of the statutes, § 1406(a) is more
appropriate for transferring cases than § 1404(a) in the forum-selection
clause context. Forum-selection clauses are not validated or invalidated be-
298cause of convenience. If they are given effect, it is because the words of
the contract indicate that the suit was brought in the "wrong" forum. 299 Ad-
ditionally, as Justice Scalia argued, while the venue statutes may provide
courts with the power to enforce transfers, the separate question of whether
they must transfer is answered elsewhere, be it from The Bremen or from the
applicable state law.
Finally, this syllogism runs into problems with the twin aims test of
Hanna. The holding in Van Dusen was intended to prevent litigants from
forum shopping.3°° As previously mentioned, however, the logic of Van
Dusen gets inverted in the forum-selection clause context.3 °' if § 1404(a) is
used to transfer the case, a plaintiff facing unfavorable law in the designated
294. See Fahlman, supra note 292, at 454.
295. See supra Parts II.C.1.b-d.
296. See, e.g., Terra Int'l Inc. v. Miss. Chem. Corp. 922 F. Supp. 1334, 1367-68 (N.D.
Iowa 1996).
297. See Ryan T. Holt, Note, A Uniform System For the Enforceability of Forum Selec-
tion Clauses in Federal Courts, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1913, 1930-33 (2009) (arguing that §
1404(a) is inadequate to resolve forum-selection clause disputes).
298. See Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545, 550 (1982).
299. Id.
300. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 633-34 (1964).
301. See infra notes 202-09 and accompanying text.
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forum could bring suit in a favorable forum knowing in advance that the
case would be transferred and that the court designated in the contract would
have to apply the law of the transferor court. This is forum-shopping and
inequitable administration of the laws for the sole reason of the "accident of
diversity." If § 1404(a) is not used, the syllogism breaks down and forum-
selection clause rules become outcome determinative.
Because these rules are manifestly outcome determinative, the next
question is whether there is a special relationship between forum-selection
clauses and substantive contractual rights and remedies. In Byrd, the Court
felt that South Carolina's practice of having judges decide the factual ques-
tion as to whether an individual was an "employee" within the Workmen's
Compensation Act was not a procedural practice bound up with the underly-
ing substantive remedy that Byrd sought.3"2 However, rules governing fo-
rum-selection clauses are the quintessential procedural rule to have a special
relationship to a substantive right.
Forum-selection clauses are part of the private law of the contract as a
whole. A drafter cannot consider the substantive provisions of the contract
without some thought to forum selection and its sister provision, choice of
law. It is a way of saying, "In exchange for the promises I am receiving, I
give up my right to bring suit in any forum but the one designated within the
contract." Thus, the designated forum is part of the consideration for the
agreement. This truth, first recognized in The Bremen, is the primary justifi-
cation for the liberal modern trend.303 If the justification for a liberal stan-
dard is that the parties are getting what they bargained for, then we are im-
plicitly recognizing that the forum-selection clause is just as much a part of
the private law of the contract as any other part. Therefore, any argument
that rules governing forum-selection clauses are merely a "form and mode"
of enforcing the substantive rights of contracts is inconsistent with The Bre-
men. It is not just a form of enforcing contracts; it is an essential part of the
contract itself. This quality compels the conclusion that forum-selection
clauses are bound up with the rights and obligations of contractual agree-
ments. Therefore, because forum-selection clauses are outcome determina-
tive and because they are uniquely characterized as having a special rela-
tionship to underlying rights, state law should govern their validity in diver-
sity cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
Forum-selection clauses are a legal anomaly with which jurists have
struggled to reconcile several legal theories. They appear substantive and
302. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elee. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958).
303. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
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often have substantive effects, yet they operate procedurally. Despite their
essential nature as private law, they displace the public law of personal ju-
risdiction. Further, the complications of forum-selection clauses are made
even more difficult by the complications of the Erie doctrine and the flawed
legal conclusions appropriated by jurists at almost every stage in the analy-
sis.
Forum-selection clauses and the rules that govern them function more
procedurally than substantively. However, because of their special relation-
ship to the substantive rights inherent in contracts, a faithful adherence to
Erie and its progeny requires that state laws be used to govern forum-
selection clauses in federal cases resting in diversity.
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